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Development of a Safety Decision-Making  
Scenario to Measure Worker Safety  
in Agriculture 
G. A. Mosher,  N. Keren,  S. A. Freeman,  C. R. Hurburgh Jr. 
ABSTRACT. Human factors play an important role in the management of occupational 
safety, especially in high-hazard workplaces such as commercial grain-handling facili-
ties. Employee decision-making patterns represent an essential component of the safety 
system within a work environment. This research describes the process used to create a 
safety decision-making scenario to measure the process that grain-handling employees 
used to make choices in a safety-related work task. A sample of 160 employees completed 
safety decision-making simulations based on a hypothetical but realistic scenario in a 
grain-handling environment. Their choices and the information they used to make their 
choices were recorded. Although the employees emphasized safety information in their 
decision-making process, not all of their choices were safe choices. Factors influencing 
their choices are discussed, and implications for industry, management, and workers are 
shared. 
Keywords. Decision-making, Grain bin, Management, Safety at work. 
afety hazards in agricultural production and handling represent a perennial concern 
for workers, management, and other agricultural professionals (BLS, 2012). Specif-
ically, personnel who work at commercial grain-handling facilities contend with a 
wide variety of safety issues spanning several safety standards and guidelines. Other safe-
ty challenges of agricultural handling facilities include the management of a large number 
of seasonal and temporary workers and the intense pressure for high productivity during 
the busy spring and fall seasons (Brandon, 2009; Chapman and Husberg, 2008; Lehtola et 
al., 2008). Previous research conducted with grain-handling personnel (Freeman et al., 
1998; Roberts and Field, 2010) and the number of incidents recorded annually at grain-
handling facilities establish that managing personnel safety at a commercial grain eleva-
tor is a challenge (Laviana, 2010). 
In hazardous industries, safety programs and the management of personnel are espe-
cially important (Das et al., 2008; Evans et al., 2005). Furthermore, in such industries, the 
success of safety programs depends on team-oriented employees who can spot potential 
issues and correct them promptly (Das et al., 2008). Employee decisions constitute a ma-
jor portion of these actions in both positive and negative ways. Consequently, the deci-
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sion-making patterns of employees have the potential to work in favor of or against or-
ganizational safety management processes (Keren et al., 2009). 
This study examines the process that workers used to make a decision choice in a safe-
ty decision-making task within a commercial grain-handling facility. Using the process-
tracing method of decision analysis, employees completed computer simulations that 
measured their decisions in a given scenario along with the dimensions (factors) they 
used to make their decisions. Understanding the factors that influence each employee’s 
choice of a safe decision is an important component of improving safety interventions 
and training for workers. When employees make safe decisions, both the workers and the 
organization see the benefits (Goetsch, 2008), but no improvement in safety can be real-
ized if employees do not make positive safety-oriented decisions on the job. 
Human Factors in Safety 
Humans are an important component of high-reliability organizations. High-reliability 
organizations have been defined as those in which safety is a critical component of opera-
tions (Cox et al., 2006). This is in part due to the intrinsic hazards of these organizations. 
Failure in safety systems at this level could lead to high-level property damage, injury, or 
loss of life (Cox et al., 2006). Examples from the literature include aviation, biotechnolo-
gy, offshore drilling, nuclear energy, and rail operations. 
Even in organizations that do not present the potential for catastrophic hazards, 
McLain and Jarrell (2007) noted that high production and technology demands can often 
result in mental and physical environments that threaten organizational safety. Multiple 
demands on a worker’s time, together with a lack of control over work tasks, can blur 
behavior expectations for workers. Although management requires workers to be both 
safe and productive, sometimes these two priorities are incompatible, given the work 
environment (McLain and Jarrell, 2007). 
Cox et al. (2006) failed to include agricultural handling facilities in their list of high-
reliability work environments, even though the commercial grain-handling industry has 
no shortage of safety hazards and the pressure for high productivity is generally high 
(Chapman and Husberg, 2008). Personnel at commercial grain-handling facilities deal 
with a wide variety of safety hazards, including confined spaces, excessive noise, and 
chemical, biological, petroleum, and electrical dangers (Lehtola et al., 2008; OSHA, 
1988, 2004; Rains, 2004; Roberts and Field, 2010). Agricultural worksites also include 
the dangerous combination of large numbers of inexperienced workers along with a pow-
erful pressure for high productivity during certain times of the year (Brandon, 2009; 
Chapman and Husberg, 2008; Lehtola et al., 2008). 
On any given day, multiple hazards are presented to workers in the agricultural han-
dling industry. These dangers are well known by workers (Walker, 2010), yet incidents 
still occur, and the injury and fatality rates in this industry are significantly higher than 
the average injury and fatality rates across all industries (BLS, 2012). 
Safety Perceptions and Safety Behavior 
One potential indicator of future safety behavior is the safety perceptions of workers. 
First defined as safety climate by Zohar (1980, 2008), this measure examines the relative 
importance of safety when compared with other business goals, as perceived by employ-
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ees. Das et al. (2008) also noted that safety climate has a significant perceptual compo-
nent. This means employees recognize and construe information or episodes differently, 
and management and supervisors may have little control over these perceptions. Keren et 
al. (2009) reiterated this, stating that employees do not respond directly to workplace 
incidents but perceive and interpret events that occur in their work environment before 
taking action. Therefore, when analyzing an incident, researchers and managers are lim-
ited to analysis after the fact, which is subject to a great deal of bias (Dekker, 2002). 
Although post-incident analysis provides valuable information, understanding factors 
that predict or characterize unsafe employee behaviors before they occur would be an 
even better tool for managers and supervisors. Two main approaches to explaining the 
safety behavior of workers have been explored by researchers. First, researchers have 
attempted to explain the ways in which employees violate safety rules, and the environ-
mental and personal factors that may contribute to unsafe behavior (Hofmann et al., 
1995). The second perspective tries to predict employee behavior by identifying predict-
ing factors and creating predictive models (Mullen, 2004). Neither approach provides a 
complete answer, but they both help to explain why workers routinely violate the long-
held assumption of self-preservation in the workplace (Maslow, 1970). 
Zohar and Erev (2007) cited a flawed weighting of hazards by the employee and the 
delayed and uncertain occurrence of negative outcomes resulting from not following 
safety procedures as major contributors to irresponsible behavior. Worker attitudes may 
be conveyed as a failure to wear protective gear, to follow safety procedures, or to com-
plete required training (Hofmann et al., 1995; Kouabenan, 2009; Reason et al., 1998). 
Workers with negative attitudes toward safety are hypothesized to behave differently in 
safety-intensive situations compared to those with more positive attitudes (Zohar, 2008). 
The second perspective of inquiry, a better understanding of factors that predict work-
place accidents, is also a high priority for researchers. Mullen’s (2004) qualitative work 
identified several factors that helped predict unsafe behaviors. Some of these include role 
overload, performance versus safety, peer pressure, and avoidance of negative conse-
quences. The first two factors address a common theme in the safety literature: the con-
tinual conflict between safety and productivity (Kouabenan, 2009; McClain and Jarrell, 
2007). Additionally, although peer pressure can be positive or negative, negative peer 
pressure is typically highlighted in the literature (Keren et al., 2009; Mullen, 2004). 
Mullen (2004) also mentioned a factor that is especially prevalent in high-reliability 
industries, which are defined as industries where safety is of utmost importance; this fac-
tor is the worker’s “image.” Several interviewees reported taking unsafe risks to impress 
either supervisors or co-workers for the purpose of securing a promotion or gaining status 
within the organization or work group (Choudhry and Fang, 2008; Mullen, 2004). Zohar 
and Erev (2007) suggested that supervisors and management can either encourage or dis-
courage these types of behaviors, but they must actively provide observation and feed-
back. 
Dekker (2002) took a different approach, focusing on behavior after the accident oc-
curs. Because many accidents are the result of human error, it is important to understand 
why people acted the way they did, rather than attempting to judge their behavior after 
the accident. Dekker (2002) pointed out that hindsight adds bias and, along with the pres-
sure to find a “fall guy” after a fatal incident or serious injury, works against the process 
of learning the mindset of the victim during his or her ordeal. Instead, Dekker (2002) 
suggested that investigators focus less on the mistake and more on learning from the mis-
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take. Instead of asking why the employee made the fatal error, he advises investigators to 
understand why the employee felt his or her actions were positive in that context. Even 
given all of these lines of research, prediction of employee safety decision-making and 
resulting behavior remains difficult. Decision-making analysis helps address some of the 
weaknesses of tools such as safety climate and predictive modeling. 
Theories Grounding Safety Decision-Making 
Several psychological theories have been offered to explain a worker’s decision-
making process in a risky environment, such as a grain-handling facility. Three theories 
were used to guide the experimental design and decision-making scenario used in this 
work: the Theory of Planned Behavior, the Expected Utility Theory, and the Prospect 
Theory. 
Murphy (2003) discussed Azjen and Fishbein’s (1969) Theory of Planned Behavior as 
it applies to an agricultural safety setting. The model involves four steps: assessing the 
problem, identification of risks (hazards), evaluating what works in addressing the prob-
lem, and a final implementation step. Murphy (2003) linked the approach to traditional 
models developed in the public health sector, where the overriding goal is behavior 
change. The approach goes beyond a one-time decision. The theory also posits that be-
havioral intentions immediately precede behavior. People will pursue their intended ac-
tion if the behavior leads to a desirable outcome, if others value the behavior, and if nec-
essary resources and opportunities are available to support the behavior (Ajzen and 
Fishbein 1969). 
Fogarty and Shaw (2010) also examined safety violations using the Theory of Planned 
Behavior and argued that the subjective norms of a workplace and perceived behavioral 
control play a role in the intention of a person to follow or not to follow safety proce-
dures. Using this perspective, several factors play a role in the decision-making scenario 
examined in the present research. The decision scenario in this work examines the influ-
ence of social norms on the intention of employees to openly violate safety procedures 
when prompted by a supervisor. The employees’ willingness to disregard safety proce-
dures would be classified as an intentional violation. However, even if the employee had 
safe intentions, subjective norms such as the expectations of supervisors might play a role 
in the employee’s ease or difficulty in violating safety procedures. 
Traditionally, a fundamental basis for risky decision-making has been the Expected 
Utility Theory (EUT), which posits that, when people make risky decisions, they weigh 
several options and the likelihood of each occurring (Newell et al., 2007; Zohar and Erev, 
2007). The option with the highest “utility” to the decision-maker is selected as the final 
choice. Based on the EUT, safe behavior should be the preferred choice. However, Zohar 
and Erev (2007) demonstrated that decision biases create a paradox whereby “careless 
behavior prevails during many routine jobs, making safe behavior an ongoing managerial 
challenge” (Zohar and Erev, 2007). In the decision-making scenario, the choice of a safe 
decision is not straightforward. In addition to questions on the perceived utility of routine 
safety decisions noted by Zohar and Erev (2007), information accessibility (Sharps and 
Martin, 2002) and cognitive distortions (Tversky and Wakker, 1995) could derail the 
employee’s intention to make a safe decision, violating both the EUT and the long-held 
assumption that self-preservation outweighs other motivations (Maslow, 1970). 
The Prospect Theory (PT) challenges the fundamental postulation of the EUT by sug-
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gesting that people tend to overweight low probabilities and underweight higher probabil-
ities, which is an example of the “distortions” introduced under the framework of the 
EUT (Tversky and Wakker, 1995). The PT also states that risk-averse behavior is more 
common when a person stands to gain, while those who perceive that they have nothing 
to lose seek greater risk in their behavior. According to Newell et al. (2007), actual prob-
abilities are often ignored by decision-makers who underestimate common outcomes and 
overestimate rare outcomes. Additionally, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) demonstrated 
that decision-makers can be more affected by decision outcomes that have a lower proba-
bility of actually occurring but more impact rather than by outcomes that have a greater 
chance of happening but a lower or uncertain impact. Both the EUT and PT imply that 
people are more sensitive to risk than to uncertainty. 
The implications of all three theories play an important role in the decision-making 
scenario in this work. The employees are faced with both risk and uncertainty: they know 
that violating the safety procedure is risky to their personal safety, but a fatality is less of 
a certainty than the possibility of the supervisor’s displeasure with them. Given the 
choice between these two alternatives, it would not be unexpected from the perspective of 
the EUT and PT that an employee would choose to please the supervisor and do the work 
quickly, rather than take the time to perform the task safely. The role of organizational 
norms (highlighted by the supervisor’s request for the employee to disregard safety pro-
cedures) as discussed in the Theory of Planned Behavior also grounded this work. 
Keren et al. (2009) established a framework for examining the relationship between 
safety climate and safety decision-making, where the decision-making process reflects 
proximate behavior. The concept of safety decision-making is defined by processes that 
are thought to play a role in the safety-related decisions that employees make on the job, 
which are termed dimensions. Mills (2007, p. 4) defined safety decision-making as “the 
process of selecting a safe alternative through information acquisition based on safety 
training, personal beliefs, values, previous experience, and accessible safety infor-
mation.” This definition is taken from decision theories and models in use for nearly 
50 years and of interest to researchers since Aristotle’s time (Buchanan and O’Connell, 
2006). The focus of this work is the creation of a safety decision-making scenario for use 
in a commercial grain-handling facility. 
In the decision-making scenario examined in this work, the risks are well known to the 
employee, yet the degree of cost versus benefit and the priority of each is not completely 
clear. This was by design rather than by accident. The decision-making scenario was 
written to test how employees would respond to conflict in their cost/benefit analysis as 
well as in their assessment of priority, as identified in decision-making theories reviewed 
by Amendola (2001) and Murphy (2003). In this case, the benefits of safe behavior and 
the support of peers may not outweigh the costs of lower productivity or disapproval 
from the supervisor. Therefore, the intended behavior outlined by the Theory of Planned 
Behavior may not lead to a desirable outcome as modeled. 
Measuring Employee Decision-Making 
In this study, the decision-making scenario was presented to employees using the deci-
sion process tracing methodology. Decision process tracing is an approach used to cap-
ture direct cognitive processes by evaluating the information that an individual uses to 
form a judgment and the sequence in which the information is examined (Ford et al., 
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1989). Other key processes recorded include: the number of alternatives viewed, the time 
needed to make a choice, and the final decision. A key advantage of process tracing is 
that it addresses the intervening steps between information acquisition and decision 
choice, which is considered a fundamental component of decision-making analysis 
(Mintz, 2004). 
Decision process tracing has several advantages over self-reported questionnaires, 
which depend on recall ability and researcher observation of work behavior, which is 
cross-sectional at best and may have serious bias related to the Hawthorne effect and oth-
er effects. Decision process tracing also has benefits that are not realized with structural 
modeling. The process tracing method focuses on the processes that humans use to ana-
lyze and gather information in preparation to making a decision, while structural model-
ing emphasizes the final choice (Ford et al., 1989). Mintz (2004) added another ad-
vantage of process tracing: the ability to isolate decision rules and models used in the 
decision-making process, as well as test the association of situational and personal factors 
with the decision process and the final decision choice. The data collected from process 
tracing can then be used to infer information on the decision-making process used by 
employees as they made a choice (Ford et al., 1989; Keren et al., 2009; Payne et al., 
1993). 
This research is significant in that it attempts to increase the level of understanding of 
the orientation toward safety in a decision-making task in an agricultural materials han-
dling environment. A second goal of this research is to measure the proportion of em-
ployees who make a safe decision choice even when presented with a scenario that dis-
courages a safe decision. This research is the first attempt to measure decision choice and 
decision orientation within an agricultural work environment. This research utilizes the 
methodology first employed by Keren et al. (2009) to establish a method to measure the 
orientation toward safety in decision-making tasks, and examines the process within a 
work environment that has been characterized multiple times as one of the most danger-
ous occupational sectors (BLS, 2012; Chapman and Husberg, 2008). 
The safety decision scenario was created based on a fundamental safety concern in all 
work environments: the failure to follow standard operating procedures (SOPs) (Keren et 
al., 2009; Zohar and Erev, 2007). The scenario was selected to reflect the response of an 
employee when presented with a potential shortcut opportunity. The dilemma presented 
is one that occurs commonly in the grain-handling industry, i.e., the bridging of out-of-
condition grain as it is unloaded from a storage container to a transportation vehicle 
(Brandon, 2009; Freeman et al., 1998; Kingman and Field, 2005). This bridging blocks 
the flow and slows or stops the grain from moving. 
The decision-making scenario and decision dimensions were developed and critiqued 
by a panel of experts in grain elevator operations using a modified Delphi method (Lin-
stone and Turoff, 2002). Weighted scores for each matrix square were assigned by the 
same panel of experts. The assigned values represented the utility of the decision choice 
in terms of safety within each dimension. The scenario was pilot-tested on a small group 
with a moderate knowledge of grain elevator operations. Slight modifications were made 
to improve the clarity of the decision scenario as a result of the pilot tests. 
Using the information contained in the matrix squares, employees viewed the infor-
mation and then selected a decision choice. The information presented to the employees 
in the decision-making scenario was not intended to represent the entire spectrum of fac-
tors that could influence their decision. Instead, the scenario focused on the factors most 
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likely to influence the decision of an employee according to both published literature and 
expert opinion. Each of the dimensions included in the scenario has been identified in 
previous research as important in safety decision-making and safety behavior (Walker, 
2010; Keren et al., 2009; Choudhry and Fang, 2008; Zohar, 2008; McLain and Jarrell, 
2007; Seo, 2005; Mullen, 2004; Prussia et al., 2003). The text of the decision simulation 
was presented as follows: 
You and a co-worker are emptying a bin and working to fill a waiting truck. Your su-
pervisor walks by to check on your progress and notices that the flow of grain to the 
truck has slowed. Your supervisor suggests keeping the auger running while someone 
gets inside the bin to release the blockage and keep the grain flowing. You are surprised 
because your organization normally follows the grain safety handling standard adminis-
tered by OSHA, which require lock out / tag out of the bin before entry. You need to de-
cide what to do next. You have the following four options: 
1. Enter the bin 
2. Follow the entrance procedure 
3. Confront the supervisor and follow the procedure 
4. Follow the procedure and report the supervisor 
These four factors could impact your decision: 
1. Safety 
2. Productivity 
3. Supervisor’s opinion of you 
4. Peer pressure 
When you are ready, follow the steps below in order to initiate and complete the simu-
lation. 
The software platform used was Decision Mind, a computerized decision-making sim-
ulation tool (Mintz, 2004). The decision structure was presented in a matrix format, as 
shown in table 1, with a set of decision alternatives and a set of dimensions. The alterna-
tives define the decision choices (C) available to the participant, and information is gath-
ered by viewing the dimensions (D). Each square of the matrix provides an evaluation of 
a given choice on a given dimension. The participant is asked to choose one alternative 
based on the information acquired from the dimensions. Each square on the matrix is also 
assigned a utility value on a scale from -10 to +10, with -10 indicating a negative evalua-
tion from a safety perspective and +10 indicating a positive evaluation. The utility values 
represent the evaluation of the safety orientation of the decision choice within a specific 
dimension. 
The decision-making simulations were presented electronically. The sequences of the 
 
 
Table 1. Decision Mind decision simulation matrix. 
Dimensions 
Choices 
C1: 
Confront Supervisor, 
Follow Procedure 
C2: 
Follow Procedure, 
Report Supervisor 
C3: 
Enter 
Bin 
C4: 
Follow 
Procedure 
D1: Supervisor’s opinion -8 -2 +7 0 
D2: Peer pressure +4 +1 -6 +4 
D3: Safety +3 +10 -10 0 
D4: Productivity -7 +4 +10 -4 
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decision choices and dimensions were randomized for each participant. A screen shot of 
the decision-making matrix as seen by a participant is shown in figure 1. When partici-
pants clicked on “select,” a pop-up window appeared identifying the potential outcome of 
the decision choice with respect to that dimension. In figure 1, the highlighted square is 
for the decision choice of following the correct safety procedure but reporting the super-
visor’s behavior from a peer pressure perspective. Figure 2 shows the pop-up window 
that would have appeared to the participant. 
Calculations 
To provide a way to quantitatively present the information gathering process complet-
ed by participants, Keren et al. (2006) introduced the search index. This measurement 
calculates the ratio between the number of times the squares of one dimension were 
viewed as compared with the other dimensions. In this study, four dimensions were 
measured: safety, productivity, supervisor opinion, and peer pressure. Accordingly, the 
search indices are the safety search index (S_SI), productivity search index (P_SI), su-
pervisor opinion search index (SO_SI), and peer pressure search index (PP_SI). The cal-
culations are shown below: 
Figure 1. Decision-making matrix as viewed by research participant. 
 
Figure 2. Decision choice outcome for the Report Supervisor choice in the Peer Pressure dimension. 
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where Nsafety is the number of times safety squares were viewed, and Ni-safety is the number 
of times squares other than safety were viewed. 
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1
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n
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N
_
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=   (2) 
where Nproductivity is the number of times productivity squares were viewed, and Ni-productivity 
is the number of times squares other than productivity were viewed. 
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1
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n
i , i N
N
_
n −= ≠
=   (3) 
where NSO is the number of times supervisor’s opinion squares were viewed, and Ni-SO is 
the number of times squares other than supervisor opinion were viewed. 
 
1
PP SI
1
i PP
PP
n
i , i N
N_
n −= ≠
=   (4) 
where NPP is the number of times peer pressure squares were viewed, and Ni-PP is the 
number of times squares other than peer pressure were viewed. 
Values less than one represent a dimension of less importance as compared with the 
other dimensions. Values greater than one represent a dimension of greater importance in 
relation to the other dimensions. Values of one indicate that the dimension plays no more 
importance than any other dimension; therefore, one is designated the “ultimate mean.” 
The dimension most affiliated with safety in this decision-making scenario is the safety 
dimension. Participants who viewed safety dimension information at a higher frequency 
were assumed to be considering safety as a prioritized source of information in their deci-
sion-making process. 
The focus of this work was the process that grain elevator employees used to make a 
decision choice in a safety-oriented decision task. Accordingly, data were collected to 
answer the following research questions: 
1. Given a safety decision-making task, what decision choice is selected by grain ele-
vator employees? 
2. What information do employees use to select a decision choice in a safety decision 
task in a grain elevator environment? 
3. Do employees emphasize safety at a higher level than the ultimate mean in their 
decision-making process? 
The decision-making simulation was presented to the study participants with the 
choices and dimensions of the decision task in random order. The participants completed 
the decision-making simulation as their work schedules permitted. For classification pur-
poses, the participants were given identification numbers. No personal identifiers were 
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linked with the identification numbers to eliminate the possibility of tracking specific 
participant responses. 
The participants were employees of three grain-handling facilities located in the upper 
Midwestern U.S. Employees who would be subject to safety-related decisions in their 
daily jobs were offered the opportunity to participate in the study. Of the 410 invitations, 
197 responded. Of these 197, 160 provided usable data, for a response rate of 39%. 
All employees were drawn from grain-handling organizations that volunteered for the 
study. Although only three grain-handling companies made up the sample, the service 
area of these three companies covered nearly one-third of the state’s area. Additionally, 
the grain-handling capacities of all three companies were large, varying between 18 mil-
lion and 217 million bushels per year. Approximately three-quarters of the data are from 
one facility, with the other two facilities providing the remainder of the data. However, 
when tested individually, the facilities showed no significant differences in their decision 
choices or decision-making processes. 
Results 
The sample consisted of 142 males and 18 females, for a total sample size of 160. Da-
ta were gathered over a two-week period in early spring. The participant ages ranged 
from below 21 to over 61, with the most common response being 41 to 50 years of age. 
Two groups of employees made up the largest portion of the sample: those with less than 
three years on the job (38.5%), and those who had been with the organization more than 
ten years (34%). Nearly all (98%) had completed high school, with over half (62%) com-
pleting at least two years of college. 
Results were calculated using SPSS (ver. 18.0, SPSS, Inc., Chicago, Ill.). Information 
from the safety decision-making simulation contained two important data points: the final 
decision choice, and information about the decision-making process. The decision-
making process is represented by the search index values, which reflect the information 
acquired by participants for each dimension as compared with the other three dimensions. 
A value of one for a particular dimension indicates that no emphasis was given to that 
dimension above the other dimensions and therefore represents the ultimate mean, or 
benchmark value. A paired-sample t-test was performed on each search index to compare 
its value with the ultimate mean. Results of the t-tests for each index are presented in 
table 2. The safety dimension was significantly higher than the ultimate mean of one. The 
supervisor’s opinion, productivity, and peer pressure dimensions were not significantly 
different from the ultimate mean of one. 
The second data point contained within the decision-making simulation was the distri-
bution of decision choices. These results are shown in figure 3. The numbers above each 
bar in the graph represent the utility value of that decision choice in the safety dimension. 
The decision choice made by the greatest number of participants was to confront the su-
pervisor and to perform the task safely, although similar numbers of workers chose to 
follow the safety procedure or report the supervisor to management. 
Table 3 displays the distribution of decision choices by participant age, gender, and 
education level. Percentages indicate the proportion of participants in a specific demo-
graphic category (e.g., male, over 60, or high school graduate) who made a specific deci-
sion. Not all participants completed the demographic information, so the sample sizes 
may differ across categories. 
 20(2): 91-107  101 
Table 2. Results of t-tests for information emphasis within a safety decision-making task (n = 160). 
Search Index Mean SD t-Score p-Level 
Safety 1.34 1.40 3.29 0.001 
Productivity 0.967 0.866 -0.526 0.600 
Supervisor’s opinion 1.13 1.32 1.28 0.201 
Peer pressure 0.978 0.911 -0.318 0.751 
 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of frequency of decision choices in a safety decision-making task (n = 161). 
 
Table 3. Distribution of gender, age, and education in decision choices. 
 
Enter 
Bin 
(N = 6) 
Follow 
Procedure 
(N = 51) 
Confront 
Supervisor 
(N = 54) 
Report 
Supervisor 
(N = 46) 
Gender Male 6 (100%) 44 (86%) 42 (78%) 29 (63%) 
 Female 0 (0%) 7 (14%) 12 (22%) 17 (37%) 
Age Under 21 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (4%) 2 (4%) 
 21-30 3 (50%) 12 (24%) 4 (7%) 11 (24%) 
 31-40 0 (0%) 7 (14%) 9 (17%) 7 (15%) 
 41-50 1 (17%) 14 (27%) 21 (39%) 14 (30%) 
 51-60 2 (33%) 12 (23%) 17 (31%) 11 (24%) 
 Over 60 0 (0%) 6 (12%) 1 (2%) 1 (2%) 
Education High school or less 0 (0%) 3 (6%) 1 (2%) 0 (0%) 
 High school 2 (33%) 19 (37%) 17 (31%) 15 (33%) 
 2-year degree 1 (17%) 13 (25%) 14 (26%) 11 (24%) 
 2 to 4 years of college 2 (33%) 5 (10%) 12 (22%) 15 (33%) 
 4-year degree 1 (17%) 10 (20%) 9 (17%) 5 (11%) 
 Graduate degree 0 (0%) 1 (2%) 1 (2%) 0 (0%) 
Discussion 
Several significant findings emerged from this study. The first research question asked 
about the decision choices made by the employees. Four alternatives were offered. With 
the exception of the small number (n = 6) who chose to enter the bin, the frequency dis-
tributions of the other three options were nearly equal, as shown in figure 3. There were 
no discernable demographic patterns for the choices, as shown in table 3. No demograph-
ic group was more likely than any another group to select a given choice. 
The second question, which is discussed in more depth later, asked about the infor-
mation that the employees used to make their decision choices. When considering the 
employees’ choices, it is important to note that no one choice was superior from all per-
spectives. Entering the bin is clearly not safe and is therefore a negative choice from a 
safety perspective, but this choice could potentially be evaluated more positively in terms 
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of productivity and supervisor opinion. As expected, few employees chose to enter the 
bin, the most unsafe option. However, the fact that any of the participants made this 
choice further supports the continuing importance of studying employees’ safety behavior 
(Brown et al., 2000; Hudson, 2009). Even when hazards are presented very clearly, em-
ployees can still make unsafe decisions (Walker, 2010). 
The other three alternatives presented in the decision-making scenario, while safer 
than entering the bin, are not equal in terms of worker safety. Choosing to follow the cor-
rect procedure does not include the issue of the supervisor asking the worker to break the 
SOP; therefore, it does not address the root cause of the problem. Confronting the super-
visor, while a safe individual decision, could have negative implications for future safety 
outcomes, especially considering that facility safety is often dependent on teamwork and 
psychological safety, i.e., the freedom of workers to correct mistakes or incorrect orders 
(Das et al., 2008; Edmondson, 1996; Kath et al., 2010). Upsetting the supervisor or 
threatening the power structure of the work group has potentially negative implications. 
Additionally, this choice could negatively impact the trust between the supervisor and the 
employee, leading to future unsafe behaviors performed in retaliation by the employee 
(Davis et al., 2000). 
The fourth choice, i.e., following the procedure but reporting the supervisor to man-
agement, has the best potential to improve safety outcomes across the entire organization 
(Keren et al., 2009; Edmondson, 1996). This action is an example of what Vredenburgh 
(2002) termed proactive practices and what Edmondson (1996) referred to as “psycholog-
ical safety,” and both of these are indicators of a safer workplace. If supervisors are ad-
vising workers to take safety shortcuts, this is a fact that a proactive management should 
be aware of, but employees must also feel comfortable reporting such behavior to man-
agement. Furthermore, if employees report unsafe behavior by supervisors to manage-
ment, then management should take action to prevent such behavior from recurring. If 
management took no action on the employee’s complaint, then the decision by the em-
ployee to report the supervisor would likely not recur, in part because of the lack of man-
agement response to the problem (Zohar, 2000; Zohar and Luria, 2005). 
The second research question asked about the information that the employees used to 
make their decision choices. To determine this information, the search index method was 
used, as introduced by Keren et al. (2006). Search indices for the four dimensions (safety, 
productivity, supervisor opinion, and peer pressure) were compared with an ultimate 
mean of one. A search index equaling one indicated that no higher emphasis was placed 
on a given dimension. Of the four dimensions, only safety was viewed by employees 
significantly more often than the ultimate mean. Therefore, the third research question, 
which asked if the safety dimension was prioritized by employees at a higher level than 
the other dimensions, can be answered positively. In addition, none of the other dimen-
sions (productivity, supervisor’s opinion, and peer pressure) showed a significant differ-
ence from the ultimate mean; therefore, a conclusion can be made that none of these di-
mensions was prioritized by the employees at a higher or lower level than the other two 
dimensions in this decision-making scenario. 
This lack of emphasis on the non-safety dimensions was unexpected for several rea-
sons. In this study, peer pressure was presented to the employees in positive terms 
through the information that popped up when the employees clicked on decision matrix 
squares (e.g., fig. 2). The participants in this study seemed to defy Mullen’s (2004) con-
clusion that peer pressure can serve as an indirect discouragement to safety by way of the 
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employee’s “image.” It seems reasonable that positive peer pressure would prevent em-
ployees from taking unsafe risks to impress supervisors or co-workers, as reported by 
Choudhry and Fang (2008). Zohar and Erev (2007) suggested that behaviors such as 
these can be encouraged or discouraged depending on the behavior of management. 
Keren et al. (2009) reported peer pressure as a significant dimension in the decision-
making tasks of manufacturing employees. Two factors could have impacted the differ-
ence in results in this study. First, the decision-making scenario used by Keren et al. 
(2009) positioned peer pressure as a negative influence on safety rather than as a positive 
influence, as was the case in this study. Second, strong support of safety by management 
might encourage employees to challenge the unsafe work practices of their peers (Zohar, 
2008), reflecting an environment of “psychological safety” observed by Edmondson 
(1996) or of “proactive practices” noted by Vredenburgh (2002). Employees who believe 
that they will be supported by management may be more likely to address unsafe work 
behaviors directly, rather than follow along with unsafe behavior. Finally, the lack of 
emphasis in the peer pressure dimension by the participants in this study suggests that 
positive peer pressure plays a lesser role than negative peer pressure in the employee de-
cision-making process (Keren et al., 2009). 
The lack of significant emphasis on the supervisor’s opinion was also unexpected. The 
supervisor’s request to put production concerns ahead of safety concerns aligns with the 
scenario described by Zohar and Luria (2005). The implication of the situation described 
by Zohar and Luria (2005) was that when employees are faced with competing demands, 
they will choose the behavior that is perceived to be the highest priority. If the supervisor 
places following orders ahead of safety considerations, this indirectly communicates to 
the employee that safety should not be the employee’s primary consideration. The fact 
that the participants in this study were able to disregard the supervisor’s opinion and 
complete the decision-making task safely was unexpected, based on both previous re-
search and theoretical basis (Zohar and Luria, 2005, Zohar and Erev, 2007). 
The data suggest that, in this case, safety considerations overcame the desire to please 
the supervisor, but the potential conflict in employees’ minds as they made their decision 
choice warrants further investigation in a similar decision-making scenario. One reason 
for this outcome could be the potential bias in employees’ perceptions, i.e., that they 
should view the safety dimension because they knew it was the safest option. Although 
the employees were not told that the study was a safety-focused experiment, the design of 
the decision-making scenario could have led them to believe this. 
The final dimension considered as part of the decision-making scenario was productiv-
ity. McLain and Jarrell (2007) noted that productivity can negatively impact safety, but 
that was not the case in this study. The reason for this is unknown, but it may be related 
to the well-known dangers of grain-handling facilities, which are routinely acknowledged 
by employees (Walker, 2010). Knowing that safety is an integral part of the job in a haz-
ardous workplace (Chapman and Husberg, 2008) may limit the willingness of employees 
to consider faster but less safe methods of performing their duties. Or, as posited by the 
Theory of Planned Behavior, social norms and expectations may influence employees to 
make work decisions based on safety rather than speed (Fogarty and Shaw, 2010). A sec-
ond theoretical basis might be that employees see little to gain from risky behavior, so 
they opt out of unsafe decisions, per the Prospect Theory (Tversky and Wakker, 1995). 
 104  Journal of Agricultural Safety and Health 
Conclusions and Limitations 
Several limitations concerning this research should be noted. First, the small sample 
size limits the ability to generalize the data to a larger population. In addition, the data 
collection process was unfamiliar to the participants, leading to possible measurement 
error. Both of these biases may have affected the results. Additionally, data were collect-
ed from only one industry, using cross-sectional data collection techniques, in only one 
region of the U.S. A larger, more heterogeneous sample would substantially strengthen 
the conclusions of this study. Related to this, the participants were drawn from a group of 
organizations that volunteered for the study. This introduces potential for selection bias. 
Another potential bias related to the sample is the data collection process. Employees 
completed the decision-making scenario as their work schedules allowed. The researchers 
were not on-site while data were collected; therefore, no information was gathered on the 
times and days of data collection. Nor was any information gathered on how much time 
employees were allocated to complete the decision-making scenario. It is unknown 
whether the participants were salaried or hourly employees; this could have impacted the 
way they responded to the decision-making scenario. Finally, no data were collected on 
whether the participants had experienced a previous safety incident. Although their safety 
training background was known, no significant relationship was found between safety 
training and participant responses. 
Other limitations involve the decision-making scenario. The scenario involved one sit-
uation presented from one perspective (i.e., safety, with a positive peer pressure empha-
sis). The scenario was not designed to include every possible dimension of the decision, 
nor did it include specific details. This was the first attempt to use the process tracing 
method and Decision Mind to collect decision-making data from grain-handling employ-
ees. For this reason, the decision-making scenario was fairly simple. The employees’ 
responses may be different for different scenarios, limiting the applicability of the results 
to other safety situations, even within the same work environment. 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that the employees’ responses were hypothet-
ical. While the employees stated that their choices represented what they would do in the 
given conditions, the difference between what employees say they will do and what they 
actually do is well documented by behavioral theory (Murphy, 2003). We acknowledge 
the potential error that these limitations bring to the conclusions of this study. 
This research was the first to examine safety decision-making in a grain-handling en-
vironment. The conclusions have raised many questions that could be addressed with 
additional empirical evidence. To better study the wide variety of safety decisions faced 
by grain-handling employees, alternate decision-making scenarios should be developed 
and tested. Additionally, the emphasis of peer pressure in the decision-making process 
warrants additional investigation and perhaps comparison of positive peer pressure with 
negative peer pressure. Additional work concerning the search dimensions of interest 
(i.e., safety, productivity, supervisor’s opinion, and peer pressure) would also be useful. 
Some of these dimensions have theoretical linkages to safety outcomes, especially 
productivity (McLain and Jarrell, 2007). Finally, a duplicate design with a wider popula-
tion and more diversity in gender, occupation, and workplace hazards would add to the 
existing body of knowledge. 
Even with the limitations and additional questions noted above, it is clear that re-
searchers still have much to understand about the process that employees use to make 
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safety decisions. The decision-making process as it unfolds in a hazardous work envi-
ronment also has many unanswered questions. A better understanding of the decision-
making process would provide a better grounding for employee training and safety inter-
ventions. For managers and supervisors, understanding, acknowledging, and addressing 
the dimensions of safety decision-making in a meaningful way is an essential part of 
managing occupational safety. 
Workplace safety decision-making has many contributing factors. In a hazardous work 
environment, safe work practices can make the difference between going home at the end 
of the day and ending the day injured or killed. For better or worse, worker behavior is 
always precipitated by a decision-making process. A better understanding of the factors 
that affect the decision-making process for safety-related tasks has potential benefits for 
workers and for those who manage the safety of workers in agricultural environments. 
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